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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between the extent of vertical ﬂexibility and the underlying
ﬁnancial choices of a ﬁrm. By vertical ﬂexibility we mean the opportunity to outsource a neces-
sary input and to reverse the choice as input market conditions dictate. A ﬁrm simultaneously
selects the portion of equity and debt and its vertical setting. Debt is provided by a lender that
requires the payment of a ﬁxed coupon over time and, as a collateral, an option to buy out the
ﬁrm in certain circumstances. Debt leads to the same level of ﬂexibility acquired by an unlevered
ﬁrm. However, investment to set up a ﬂexible technology occurs earlier. An alternative to debt
is the involvement of venture capital for the production of the input. We explore this second
avenue ﬁnding that the extent of outsourcing adopted is lower than for the unlevered ﬁrm, but
the ﬁrm invests earlier.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of the ensuing pages is to analyse the relationship between the ﬁnancial structure and
the ﬂexibility of the vertical organization of a corporate enterprise. By vertical ﬂexibility we mean
the opportunity for a ﬁrm to buy inputs from the market, i.e., to do outsourcing (OS) in a variable
and reversible manner, going back to internal production if necessary. The organizational aspects of
OS and ﬂexibility are crucial for most ﬁrms which buy inputs in diﬀerent and variable proportions
and change quite often the extension of activity along the vertical chain of the producion process.
Flexibility improves the ability to cope with uncertain scenarios and has considerable eﬀects on
competitiveness, scale of production and social eﬃciency1. OS and ﬂexibility do not come for free
since the acquisition of inputs from the market requires the setting up of a supply chain with speciﬁc
logistic investment. A vertically ﬂexible ﬁrm decides to substitute an internally produced input
with an externally provided one while keeping the option of bringing back in-house (backsourcing or
reshoring) the same production. In such a case it must keep alive a dedicated internal facility and the
associated know-how. As a matter of fact, ﬂexibility may turn out to be quite dear. Moreover, the
costs of ﬂexibility may be aﬀected by technical progress, by eﬃciency of external markets, i.e., the
opportunity of buying easily inputs from producers which may be specialized or located in low cost
countries and, last but not the least, by the design of a proper capital budgeting. This ﬁnal aspect
is crucial: each ﬁrm should try to ﬁnance vertical ﬂexibility in the best way in terms of the mix
between equity, debt and other possible ﬁnancial sources such as venture capital2. Unfortunately
this ﬁnancial aspect is often sidestepped in the analysis of both vertical relationships and ﬂexibility
since funding and organization themes are studied separately in ﬁnancial3, managerial, industrial
organization and operations research literature4. This partly unexplored ﬁeld requires to analyse
jointly ﬁnance and vertical organization issues. On the real side we shall be concerned with the
extent and the type of vertical ﬂexibility, that can be secured by arms’ length OS of inputs while
maintaining in all cases a partial in-house prudential production. On the ﬁnancial side we shall
see how the mix between equity and debt or the participation of a venture capitalist may aﬀect
the extent of ﬂexibility acquired and the time sequence of the investment in ﬂexibility. Financial
sources may be represented by new equity, debt (convertible or nonconvertible) or by a venture
capitalist. We exclude from our investigation new equity raised through an IPO (initial public
oﬀering) since it tends to reduce the price of existing stock and may open the way to a loss of
control5.
Since ﬂexible technologies reduce risk (proﬁt volatility) they may be considered as a kind of
(real) option and their price should reﬂect their (option) value (Amran and Kulatilaka, 1999, Ch.
1 In a strategic environment the amount of ﬂexibility adopted by interacting ﬁrms (Yoshida, 2012) aﬀects uncer-
tainty which becomes endogeneously determined. The more ﬂexible is a ﬁrm the more uncertain becomes the scenario
for the rival. In our analysis we disregard strategic market interactions. Therefore, uncertainty is exogeneous and is
not dependent upon ﬂexibility.
2Other ﬁnancial channels may be activated by a ﬁrm. For the sake of simplicity we conﬁne to debt, equity and
the involvment of a venture capitalist.
3See, for a good survey of main related issues, Tirole (2006).
4See Van Mieghen (1999), Wang, Liu and Wang (2007), Moretto and Rossini (2012) where a good deal of literature
on these latter aspects is surveyed.
5See Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007).
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16). As a result the presumption is that the value of a vertically ﬂexible ﬁrm be weakly larger than
the value of a corresponding non ﬂexible ﬁrm. Yet, we shall see that this is not always the case
whenever the cost of ﬂexibility and the related ﬁnancial aspects are properly taken into account.
Our investigation is prompted by broad casual observation and press reports6 showing that most
ﬁrms change over time their vertical production structure, expanding and/or subsequently reducing
(or the other way round) the extent of OS of inputs7. For instance in the automotive industry most
brands adopt partial OS, i.e., concomitant internal production and purchase of engines and other
intermediate products from external sources. Moreover, the extent of OS is frequently changed as
witnessed by the variable level of value added over revenue found in balance sheets and, indirectly,
in everydays news. Since diﬀerent organizational settings exhibit distinct degrees of risk it is worth
seeing how the ﬁnancial choices aﬀect the degree of ﬂexibility acquired.
Literature has recently examined vertical ﬂexibility (Shy and Stenbacka, 2005; Alvarez and
Stenbacka, 2007; Moretto and Rossini, 2012; Yoshida, 2012) scantly going into the relationship with
capital structure. Contributions on the link between industrial decisions and ﬁnancial structure
may be found in Lederer and Singhal (1994), in Leland (1998), in Mauer and Sarkar (2005),
Benaroch et al. (2012), Banerjee et al. (2014). Mainstream literature does not address the speciﬁc
question about which ﬁnancial decision favors vertical ﬂexibility and OS. However, most of the few
contributions, show that ineﬃciency arises if organizational and strategic decisions are not taken
simultaneously with ﬁnancial choices. Mauer and Sarkar (2005) focus on the agency cost of ﬁnancing
investment with debt in a dynamic stochastic framework. In a similar environment Leland (1998)
digs the same topic raised in the seminal paper of Jensen andMeckling (1976). Unlike Leland (1998),
Mauer and Sarkar (2005) emphasize the ineﬃciency of debt. In the traditional Modigliani and Miller
(1958) scenario the value of a ﬁrm is given by the sum of its liabilities. Equity and debt turn out to be
quite close (in certain circumstances, perfect) substitutes. However, equityholders and debtholders
do not usually coincide and each group maximizes a diﬀerent objective function. Shareholders
maximize the equity value while debtholders maximize the debt value. The consequence is a
subadditive result. Only a "social planner" would rather maximize the sum of debt and equity
pursuing a ﬁrst best. Mauer and Sarkar (2005) calculate the agency cost of debt as the diﬀerence
between the total value of a ﬁrm where each group of stakeholders optimizes separately and the
case where the whole value of the ﬁrm is jointly maximized. Equityholders, in a limited liability
legal framework, tend to overinvest if they do not face the proper agency cost of debt conﬁrming
the old Jensen and Meckling (1976) wisdom. The issue of going back and forth from (complete)
OS to vertical integration is studied in Benaroch and al. (2012) who analyse the particular case of
service production. OS may allow a ﬁrm facing volatile demand to avoid the risk of bearing ﬁxed
costs that cannot be easily covered. By (complete) OS of services which are capital intensive the
ﬁrm turns a ﬁxed into a variable cost cutting risk. If it wants to go back to internal production it
must bear each time a ﬁxed cost. While in our model we go through the privately optimal (hence,
variable) extent of OS contingent upon the capital structure adopted, in the Benaroch et al. (2012)
paper the main question is about the optimal switching from (complete) OS to backsource and
6For instance Apple has recently increased the OS of some inputs while reducing and bringing back home other
inputs. See for further examples: The Economist (2011, 2013), Forbes (2012).See also empirical assesments in Klein
(2005) and Rossini and Ricciardi (2005).
7Examples may found in Benaroch et al. (2012).
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the value of the switching option, which is bound to increase with demand volatility and the skill
intensity of the production process of the input.
In Banerjee et al. (2014) the investment in a new technology, such as a ﬂexible vertical process,
ﬁnanced by an external subject is seen as a joint option. Size of the investment, timing of the
exercise of the option and rule concerning the sharing of returns of the investment have to be
established jointly by the ﬁrm and by the ﬁnancial investor. According to Banerjee et al. (2014)
it is ineﬃcient to specify a sharing mode before the venture is carried out. Bakhtiari and Breunig
(2014), at ﬁrm level on longitudinal data, assess OS as a device to smooth demand uncertainty.
They ﬁnd an asymmetric link with demand ﬂuctuations, i.e., OS increases substantially during
slumps while does not respond much to demand increases. Some scanty data investigation on the
ﬁnancial counterpart of OS is attempted but it is fairly inconclusive. OS appears deﬁnitely as a
shield against market contraction. In Moon and Phillips (2014) a higher level of OS makes the ﬁrm
less risky in terms of cash ﬂows. The result is a capital structure with less debt and more equity
mainly in high value-added industries.
In the ensuing pages we are going to consider two alternative cases. In the ﬁrst the control right
over the investment decision is allocated to the ﬁrm (i.e., the shareholders), while in the second
case the control belongs with an outside investor (i.e., a venture capitalist). As in Banerjee et al.
(2014) both actors agree in advance over the sharing rule of the project value. While the timing
of the investment is determined by one party the terms of the investment are determined by both
parties. In both cases the level of OS is always set by the operating party.
As to the ﬁnancial terms of the investment, in the ﬁrst case we shall be concerned with debt
ﬁnancing. To overcome the agency problem of debt, the lender is granted an option to buy out the
ﬁrm if OS becomes the main source of proﬁts for shareholders and in-house production gets almost
irrelevant. The alternative case considers a pure equity oﬀer: ownership is shared with an outside
investor (venture capitalist) without side payments (i.e., no debt service by the ﬁrm).
In our endeavor we shall couple two streams of contributions: one on vertical ﬂexibility and the
timing of adoption of a speciﬁc technology to carry out OS (Moretto and Rossini, 2012; Shy and
Stenbacka, 2005; Alvarez and Stenbacka, 2007; Alipranti, Miliou and Petrakis, 2014) and another on
ﬁnancial choices of a ﬁrm in an uncertain dynamic framework (Leland, 1994; Lederer and Singhal,
1994; Banerjee et al., 2014; Triantis and Hodder, 1990).
With debt the ﬁrm may rush to adopt ﬂexibility, but it may be hard to ﬁnance it unless the
lender gets as a collateral an option to buy the entire ﬁrm in case ﬂexibility turns out not to be
proﬁtable enough. The result is that (warranted) debt makes a ﬁrm invest earlier in the vertically
ﬂexible technology. When a venture capitalist is involved, again the investment occurs earlier but
the extent of OS is lower than with pure equity.
The paper roadmap is the following: in section 2 we see the basic model, in section 3 we go
through the value of a vertically ﬂexible ﬁrm in the control case without debt, in section 4 we
introduce debt, in section 5 we go through the case of venture capital. The epilogue is in section 6.
4
2 The basic set up
We consider the internal organization of a vertically ﬂexible enterprise that for each unit of output
to be produced needs one unit of a perfectly divisible input (perfect vertical complementarity). The
ﬁrm has to decide whether to buy a vertically ﬂexible technology that allows to manufacture the
input in-house at the constant marginal cost d, to resort (totally or partially) to OS, in case the
market price of the input, ct, is low enough, and to reverse the choice over time (backsourcing), if
ct goes up to a suﬃcient extent. In the speciﬁc, the enterprise, at any time, can switch from totally
making the input in-house when cˆt ≡ αct + (1− α)d rises above d, to partially purchasing it if cˆt
falls below d and viceversa, where α ∈ (0, 1] is the outsourced share (its complement to one is the
home produced portion).
Then, assuming, for the sake of tractability, that there are no ﬁxed costs in the production of
the input, the instantaneous proﬁt function can be written as:8
πt ≡ max {0, [p− d+max(d− cˆt, 0)]} (1)
where p is the output market price. When α < 1 the ﬁrm uses a linear combination of produced
and procured input. It can go back to vertical integration if cˆt becomes too high. Finally, to avoid
default, we assume that p− d > 0.9
The sunk cost of the ﬂexible technology is given by:10
I(α) = k1 +
k2
2
α2 for α ∈ (0, 1] (2)
where k1 is the direct cost to keep internal facilities working (i.e., the cost of maintenance and
updating the process for the internal production of the input) with total or partial OS. The term
k2
2 α
2 is the organizational cost to design and run a system devoted to obtain a cost advantage
from a vertically ﬂexible technology and to procure the input from the market (Simester and Knez,
2002). That requires setting up a supply chain of subcontractors, monitoring input quality and
contract enforcement and so on.
We do not consider investment in capacity expansion, i.e., we assume that capacity is already
employed to meet demand in the best way producing the input in-house. The cost to keep in
operation the internal facilites is ﬁxed whilst the organizational cost grows as the extent of OS
8Fixed costs would not change qualitatively our conclusions. They give rise to a hysteresis interval in the option
to switch from producing the input in-house to outsourcing it. See Benaroch et al. (2012) for the consideration of
ﬁxed costs.
9Vertical ﬂexibility, as stressed in the introduction, is an insurance against risk based on the maintanance of
the know how and the facilities to produce the input in house. This assumption allows us to focus on diﬀerential
arrangements to ﬁnance and to see how they aﬀect the decision as to whether and when to invest in the ﬂexible
technology and as to the extent of OS.
10The sunk cost to build up the mixed technology is assumed quadratic only for the sake of simplicity. None of the
results is altered if the investment cost is of type I(α) = k1+ k2α
δ with δ > 1 as in Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007).
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tends towards its maximal level11. Therefore, we explicitly esclude the case α = 0 with k1 > 0.
12
Notice that, when α = 1, the ﬁrm buys the input entirely from an independent provider, while
keeping the option of returning to complete internal manufacturing.13
The scenario is one of dynamic uncertainty where the input market price ct follows a geometric
Brownian motion14:
dct = γctdt+ σcdzt (3)
where dzt is the increment of a Wiener process (or Brownian motion) uncorrelated over time, σ the
istantaneous volatility of the market input price and γ the drift parameter. 15
Finally, as anticipated in the introduction, we assume that the ﬁrm may ﬁnance the required
investment for the ﬂexible technology in two alterantive ways. 1) By debt, which may become
convertible since it contains an option on the existing shares. 2) By venture capital to ﬁnance the
production of the input. In both cases the constant discount factor is r. Shareholders, lenders and
venture capitalists are all assumed to be risk neutral.16
3 The benchmark case: an unlevered vertically ﬂexible or pure
equity enterprise
As a benchmark, we consider the optimal OS share and the optimal investment policy of a ﬁrm
entirely ﬁnanced by equityholders (i.e., the unlevered ﬁrm value).
3.1 The operating value
We go through the operating ﬁrm’s value in two distinct cases. In the ﬁrst we consider a vertically
integrated ﬁrm manufacturing the input in house, if cˆt > d, keeping the option of buying it. In
11The increasing cost of recurring to OS may be seen as the mirror image of a (speciﬁcity based) hold-up which
grows with the share of OS as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE ) that emphasizes how hold-up in OS relationships
make input markets less eﬃcient than internal production (Williamson, 1971; Joskow, 2005; Whinston, 2003).Of
course generic inputs like, for instance, janitorial services do not require speciﬁc know how and cannot be modeled
in this way (Anderson and Parker, 2002; Holmes and Thornton, 2008) while for other services ﬂexibility of OS may
matter a lot (Benaroch et al., 2012).
12The case α = 0 with k1 > 0, rapresents the standard case where the ﬁrm invests in a plant just to produce the
input in house. We neglect this case.
13This is the case of Benaroch and al. (2012) where entry and exit occur always with α = 1 and there is a ﬁxed
cost. In our framework, once the ﬂexible technology has been acquired, the ﬁrm can enter and exit without further
costs at any level of α.
14The dynamic setting adopted implies that the input market is perfectly competitive or that the forces moving the
price over time do not depend on the market structure. A diﬀerent approach is adopted by Billette de Villemeur,
Ruble, Versaevel (2014) where an imperfect market for the input in the upstream section of production makes the
ﬁrm delay entry. In such cases vertical integration regains its superiority.
15 Input price uncertainty may be due to the exchange rate if the input is bought abroad (see Kogut and Kulatilaka,
1994; Dasu and Li, 1997; Kouvelis et al. 2001).
16Alternatively, under the assumption of complete capital markets, we can assume that there are some traded
assets that can be used to hedge the input cost uncertainty zt of (3). These traded assets with a riskless asset allow
to construct a continuously re-balanced self-ﬁnancing portfolio that replicates the value of the ﬁrm (Constantinides,
1978; Harrison and Kreps, 1979; Cox and Ross, 1976).
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the second case we see an enterprise which adopts OS, if cˆt < d, acquiring a share α of the input
while making in-house the remaining 1 − α, keeping the option to manufacture the whole input
requirement, if cˆt goes further up. Since, for α > 0, the condition cˆt > d implies ct > d , standard
arguments lead to a general solution for the unlevered operating ﬁrm’s value taking the following
functional form (See Appendix A):
V U (ct;α) =

p−d
r + A˜c
β2
t if ct > d
p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ

+ B˜c
β1
t if ct < d.
(4)
where β2 < 0 and β1 > 1 are, respectively, the negative and the positive roots of the characteristic
equation: Φ(β) ≡ 12σ
2β(β − 1) + γβ − r.
Notice that V U (ct;α) is a convex function of ct, with limc→∞ V
U (ct;α) =
p−d
r and limc→0 V
U (ct;α) =
p−(1−α)d
r . Moreover,
p−d
r and

p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ

are the present values of the ﬁrm associated to the
two distinct vertical arrangements and, as it appears from (4), viable in-house production rules out
any closure option or default. Additional terms A˜c
β2
t and B˜c
β1
t indicate respectively the value of
the option to go from vertical integration to OS and the other way round. The constants A˜ and B˜
are positive and equal to (See Appendix A):
B˜(α) = αB ≡ αβ1−β2
(r − γβ2)d
1−β1 1
r(r−γ)
A˜(α) = αA ≡ αβ1−β2
(r − γβ1)d
1−β2 1
r(r−γ) .
(5)
If α→ 0, the ﬁrm is vertically integrated, both A˜ and B˜ → 0. If α→ 1 the input is bought entirely
from an independent provider. Even in this extreme case, the ﬁrm has the option to switch to
internal production that (represented by B˜c
β1
t ) makes for a larger value of the ﬁrm than without
the reversal opportunity.
3.2 The optimal OS share and investment timing
Let’s now derive both the optimal investment timing and OS. The ﬁrm optimally sets the proportion
of OS once the investment in the ﬂexible technology is carried out. Therefore, by working backward,
we determine the optimal α.We consider the case of a ﬁrm manufacturing in-house the input, while
holding the option to switch to OS, at a future date, if ct becomes lower than d.
17
Then, with ct > d, the problem is to select α that maximizes (4) minus the cost of setting up a
dedicated production organization consistent with OS, i.e.:
α∗U = argmax

p− d
r
+ A˜c
β2
t − I(α)
	
(6)
17Adopting a diﬀerent starting point would not make sense since the option to do OS exists only if the ﬁrm is not
doing it.
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where I(α) is given by (1). Solving (6) we get:
α∗U (ct) =

1 if ct ≤ c˜
U
A
k2
c
β2
t if ct > c˜
U (7)
where c˜U ≡

k2
A
1/β2
. Since ∂α
∗U
∂ct
< 0, if ct is low it is better to choose complete OS, while, as ct
increases α goes down and tends to zero for high values of ct. In other words, as ct rises it becomes
less likely that it will fall enough to justify investment in ﬂexibility.
Let’s now turn to the optimal investment policy. Denoting by c∗U the input price triggering
investment, the value of the option to invest (i.e. the ex-ante value of the ﬁrm), is given by:
FU (ct) = max
T∗U
Et[e
−r(T∗U−t)]


V U (c∗U , α∗U (c∗U )− I(α∗U (c∗U )

(8)
where T ∗U = inf{t ≥ 0 | ct = c
∗U} is the optimal investment timing, and α∗U (c∗U ) is the optimal
OS share at entry. The standard method used for V U can be applied again to ﬁnd the general
solution of (8) and to derive c∗U . In particular assuming that the current value of ct is suﬃciently
high so that immediate investment is not optimal, we can prove that:
Proposition 1 The ex-ante value can be written in compact notation as:
FU (ct) =

FUc
β2
t for ct > c
∗U
p−d
r + A˜(α
∗U (c∗U ))c
β2
t − I(α
∗U (c∗U )) for d < ct ≤ c∗U
. (9.1)
where the constant FU = A˜, while the optimal trigger is:
c∗U =


2k2

p−d
r − k1

A

1/β2
(9.2)
and the OS share is
α∗U = min

2p−dr − k1
k2
, 1
 (9.3)
Proof See Appendix A
Notice that a solution for c∗U exists if k1/
p−d
r < 1.
18 As the ﬁrm maintains the ability to produce
the input in-house, the ex-ante value of the option to invest is simply given by the value of the
option to do OS, once the ﬂexible technology has been adopted, i.e.:
18We assume that this always holds.
8
FU (ct) = A˜(α
∗U (c∗U ))c
β2
t for ct > c
∗U (10)
Further, as ∂α
∗U
∂ct
< 0, it is evident from (9.2) and (9.3) that a necessary condition for having
c∗U > c˜U > d and then α∗U < 1, is p−dr − k1 <
k2
2 . Otherwise it is always better to set α
∗U = 1.
In words, the ﬁrm sets α∗U = 1 if in-house input production leads to proﬁts suﬃcient to cover
organizational costs to buy the entire input requirement.
4 Debt funding with a take over option (warrant)
Going through the case of debt, we assume that the ﬁrm negotiates a contract with a (ﬁnancial)
investor to get the funds to cover part of the cost of the ﬂexible technology paying a ﬁxed coupon
D per year. Unlike traditional (riskless) debt ﬁnancing, the shareholders grant the lender a call
option to buy out the ﬁrm to make the project attracting. That may occur if operative proﬁts
become very high as the market input price has gone extremely low and the ﬂexible technology
is expected to become useless. This option may be seen as a warrant on the debt, i.e., a kind of
"sweetener" for the investor.19
The sequence of moves, in this case, is the following: ﬁrst the ﬁrm and the lender decide the
terms of the contract (i.e., the coupon and the buy out option in the covenant). Then, the ﬁrm
optimally sets both the level of ﬂexibility α and the investment timing while the lender chooses
how much to lend and when to buy out the ﬁrm.20
Since the funding contract contains a speciﬁc covenant (the warrant) allowing the lender to buy
out the ﬁrm it seems reasonable to assume that a rational shareholder signs the contract only if
the coupon D < p − d. In addition, we assume that the lender, who takes over, to minimize risk
continues production with the optimal share decided by the incumbent shareholders.
4.1 The operating value
As for the benchmark case, we ﬁrst compute the market value of the production facility which is
given by the sum of the market value of equity and of debt. In this case, the instantaneous proﬁt
is:
πt ≡ [p− d−D +max(d− cˆt, 0)] (2bis)
where the technology allows the ﬁrm to manufacture the input in-house with proﬁts p−d−D ≥ 0.
19The loan may be considered as a convertible (into equity) debt. To some extent all kinds of debt may be liable
to be considered as convertible into something else even if there are inﬁnite types of conversion of debt according to
the ﬁnancial rules and the legal framework in which that occurs. After all each debt implies a collateral, i.e., some
kind of pawn.
20Notice the relevance of the point concerning who sets the timing of the investment. The evaluation of debt may
take place in diﬀerent scenarios. We conﬁne to a simple, realistic, framework where the lender buys out the entire
equity and adopts the outsourcing setting chosen by incumbent shareholders. Of course this is not the only possible
scenario. We may consider cases in which the option is not to buy the entire equity but just a chunk or cases in
which the lender decides to keep ﬂexibility without constraining to OS for ever.
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4.1.1 Equity
Deﬁning E (ct;D) as the market value of the equity, the analogous general solution for the value of
levered equity is:
Lemma 1 The value of levered equity (for incumbent shareholders) is:
E (ct;α) =

(p−d−D)
r + Aˆc
β2
t if ct > d,
p−(1−α)d−D
r −
αct
(r−γ)

+ Bˆ1c
β1
t + Bˆ2c
β2
t if c
l < ct < d
0 if ct ≤ c
l
(11)
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation Φ(β) and c
l the level of
the input price that triggers the buy out by the lender.
Proof See Appendix B
As before, the terms Aˆc
β2
t and Bˆ1c
β1
t indicate respectively the value of the option to go from
vertical integration to OS and the other way round. Diﬀerently, the term Bˆ2c
β2
t is the loss for the
incumbent shareholders when the ﬁrm is bought out, therefore Bˆ2 < 0. This loss can be seen as a
kind of agency cost (as in Mauer and Sarkar, 2005), that the equity has to pay to the lender. In
the absence of any agency fee shareholders would excessively increase debt since they are protected
by limited liability. That puts a boundary on losses which cannot exceed equity while leaving to
shareholders the opportunity of getting the upside cream, i.e., proﬁts, in bonanza times. In other
words, the option of the lender to buy out the leveraged ﬁrm decreases the equity market value.
Bˆ2c
β2
t , representing the loss due to the threat of take over by the lender, is equal to the value of
the call option in the hands of the lender who has the right to buy out the ﬁrm if ct goes below
cl.21
Furthermore, by the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions at ct = d , we are able
to show that (see Appendix B):
Aˆ = A˜+ B˜2, Bˆ1 = B˜ and Bˆ2 < 0 (12)
The constant Bˆ1 is the same regardless of whether the ﬁrm has to decide only the extent of vertical
ﬂexibility or the capital structure as well. In other words, once the investment is undertaken, the
option value of ﬂexibility to go from OS to vertical integration remains the same regardless of the
way it is ﬁnanced. On the contrary the option value to go OS diﬀers with respect to the unlevered
ﬁrm, since it carries the risk of being taken over. Now, the constant Aˆ, may even turn out negative.
Here, the novelty concerns Bˆ2 which takes into account the possible buy out by the lender if the
input price goes below the threshold cl. If the take over threat is not high (i.e., cl → 0) the option
value of OS is deﬁnitely positive while, if the threat is quite high, it is not proﬁtable to do OS and
the relative option suﬀers. Then, the ﬁrm must consider the eﬀect on its equity value of ﬁnancing
OS and ﬂexibility with debt.
21cl must be lower than the internal cost of production d for the buy out to make sense.
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4.1.2 Debt
The market value of debt D (ct;α), since it has no stated maturity, will be given by:
Lemma 2 The value of debt is:
D (ct;α) =

D
r +Cc
β2
t if ct > c
l,
p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ if ct ≤ c
l.
(13.1)
where C = − 1β2−1

p−(1−α)d−D
r

(cl)−β2 > 0, while the buy out trigger is:
cl =
β2
β2 − 1
(r − γ)
α

p− (1− α)d−D
r
	
> 0 (13.2)
Proof See Appendix B
The take over occurs when the ﬂexible technology is expected to become useless, i.e., when the
market input price has gone substantially low to suggest that it will be better to buy the input,
rather than producing it, for ever. The fresh owner will behave like the former shareholders in
terms of optimal strategies adopted by the ﬁrm. This assumption is a simplication. Other possible
scenarios may be featured.
Some comparative statics shows that:
∂cl
∂α
< 0 and
∂cl
∂D
< 0.
The negative relationship between cl and α shows the countervailing interests of the shareholdersm
vis à vis the lender. If the ﬁrm sets a low level of α (i.e., it tends to be vertically integrated), the
lender would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to buy the ﬁrm, i.e., cl → d. On the contrary, if the ﬁrm adopts a high
α (i.e., the input is bought mainly from an independent provider), the lender prefers not to bear the
risk and sticks to the coupon D. If α is high the beneﬁt of keeping the facility to produce in-house
has a low value. As for the second comparative statics inequality it appears that an increase in the
coupon (the beneﬁt for the lender) lets the trigger price decrease, i.e., the take over becomes less
likely. With a larger coupon the lender gets a higher compensation that relaxes the take over threat
and is less eager to buy out the ﬁrm by converting debt into equity. The assumption p−d−D > 0
guarantees that both cl and C are positive.
Finally, by Lemma 1 and 2, the market value of the levered ﬁrm is given by:
V L(ct;α) = E (ct;α) +D (ct;α) (14)
=

p−d
r + Aˆc
β2
t +Cc
β2
t if ct > d,
p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ + Bˆ1c
β1
t + Bˆ2c
β2
t +Cc
β2
t if c
l < ct < d
p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ if ct ≤ c
l
11
where, using (12) and (13.1), we are now able to isolate the constants Aˆ and Bˆ2. In particular we
get (See Appendix B):
Aˆ = A˜− B˜cl(β1−β2) −C, and Bˆ2 = −B˜c
l(β1−β2) −C. (15)
Note that, if cl → 0 (i.e., the ﬁrm is never bought by the lender), then Aˆ → A˜ > 0 is always
positive and Bˆ2 → 0. We are back to the unlevered ﬁrm as in Section 4. On the contrary, if c
l → d
(i.e., the ﬁrm is bought the ﬁrst time it does OS), then Aˆ → −αd γ(r−γ)
1
rd
−β2 − C < 0 which is
always negative as well as Bˆ2. This is a crucial result in our model: even if an option value is,
by deﬁnition, always non negative, it is possible that the cost of obtaining such an option exceeds
its beneﬁts making the "strategic" value of the option negative. In this case, the cost of the option
handed over to the lender may rub out the value of the option to go from vertical integration to
OS reducing the equity value of the ﬁrm for shareholders. This becomes evident by substituting
(15) in (14), i.e.:
V L(ct;α) = V
U (ct;α)−Et[e
−r(T l−t)]B˜cl β1 for ct > d, (16)
where T l = inf{t ≥ 0 | ct = cl} is the buy out timing and Et[e−r(T
l−t)] =

ct
cl
β2 .22 The value of the
levered ﬁrm is equal to the unlevered ﬁrm minus the discounted value of the option to go from OS
to vertical integration calculated at the buy out time. As expected, the value of the ﬁrm does not
depend on debt but on the covenant contained in the contract which corresponds to a shut down
option (for equityholders). In words, the value of the ﬁrm depends on the (strategic) interaction
between the lender and the shareholders. If such an interaction did not exist, the value of the ﬁrm
would be the sum of debt and equity and the use of debt would not erode the value of equity, i.e.,
V L(ct;α) = V
U (ct;α).
23
4.2 The optimal OS share and the investment timing
Since equityholders control both the decision about the OS share and the timing of the investment
we proceed stating ﬁrst α∗L and then the optimal investment trigger c∗L. To get the optimal α∗L,
equityholders maximize (11) minus the cost of setting up the production organization with partial
OS:
α∗L = argmax [E(ct;α)− (I(α)− k)] (17)
where k ≤ I(α) is the share of the investment expenditure paid by the lender who controls the
amount to loan and the buy out timing. Since a rational investor will not agree to ﬁnance the
ﬁrm unless k is a (ﬁnancially) fair price for the debt, we set k = D (ct;α) for ct > c
l.24 Then,
22The expected present value Et[e
−r(T l−t)] =

ct
cl
β2 , can be determined by using dynamic programming (see e.g.
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, pp. 315-316).
23The coupon disappears when we sum debt and equity values to obtain the entire value of the ﬁrm.
24Note that the lender chooses the amount of the loan as a function of ct. That is, as in Mauer and Sarkar (2005), the
contract may be seen as a revolving credit line where the ﬁrm decides when to use it.
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substituting in (17), we obtain:
α∗L = argmax

V L(ct;α)− k1 −
k2
2
α2
	
(18)
where V L(ct;α) is given by (14).
As before, let’s consider a ﬁrm manufacturing in-house the input, while holding the option to
switch to OS. Solving (18) the optimal OS share is given by:
[A− S(α∗L)]c
β2
t − k2α
∗L = 0 (19)
where A is as in (5), S(α) = Bclβ1−β2

1− (β1 − β2)
p−d−D
p−(1−α)d−D

< 0 and S′(α) > 0. Since
∂α∗L
∂ct
< 0, if ct is low it is better to choose complete OS, while, as ct increases α goes down and
tends to zero for high values of ct. Further, if c
l → 0, S(α)→ 0, and then α∗L → α∗U .
Deﬁning with FL(ct) the value of the option to invest in the vertically ﬂexible technology, this
is equal to (8) with T ∗L = inf{t ≥ 0 | ct = c
∗L} as the optimal investment timing. Then, going
through the same steps as before, we can prove that:
Proposition 2 The ex-ante value can be written as:
FL(ct) =

FLc
β2
t for ct > c
∗L
p−d
r + Aˆ(α
∗L(c∗L))c
β2
t +C(α
∗L(c∗L))c
β2
t − I(α
∗L(c∗L)) for d < ct ≤ c
∗L
.
(20.1)
where the constant FL = A˜(α∗L(c∗L))− B˜(α∗L(c∗L)cl(β1−β2), while the optimal trigger is:
c∗L =


2k2

p−d
r − k1

A− S(α∗L)

1/β2
(20.2)
and α∗L, by (19), becomes:
α∗L = min

2p−dr − k1
k2
, 1
 (20.3)
Proof : See Appendix C
Substituting FL in (20.2), we can write the value of the option to invest in the form:
FL(ct) = A˜(α
∗L(c∗L))c
β2
t −Et[e
−r(T l−t)]B˜clβ1 for ct > c
∗L (21)
Notice that, unlike the case of pure equity, if shareholders keep the possibility to decide both
the optimal OS and the timing of the investiment, the value of investing in the new technology
comes from the value of the option to do OS minus the value of the option to exit held by debt
holders.By direct inspection of (9.2), (21.2) and (9.3), (21.3) the following proposition summarizes
the comparison with respect to the unlevered ﬁrm.
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Proposition 3 The levered ﬁrm invests always earlier than the unlevered ﬁrm, i.e. :
c∗L ≥ c∗U (22.1)
but adopts the same proportion of outsourced input, i.e.:
α∗L = α∗U . (22.2)
Since the levered ﬁrm decides both α∗L and c∗L by maximizing only the value of equity, it does
not care of the risk carried by the lender. Part of the investment is paid by the lender and the
risk born by the equityholders is just the buy out option in the hands of the lender. In this case
the equityholders have an incentive to invest as soon as possible to get a higher loan and reap the
proﬁts of OS as soon as possible.
Using (10), (21) and Proposition 3, we ﬁnd that FL(ct) < FU (ct), for ct > c∗L ≥ c∗U . Hence
the value of the option to invest in the ﬂexible technology is lower for the levered ﬁrm with a take
over option (warrant) than for the unlevered ﬁrm, as is to be expected.
5 Venture capitalist involvement
Now let us assume that the ﬁrm oﬀers to an outside investor, a venture capitalist (VC), a share
of proﬁts ψ ∈ (0, 1) (without side payments) to ﬁnance the ﬂexible technology. This is just a take
or leave oﬀer. The VC may accept the oﬀer together with the option to optimally decide when to
implement the deal.25 If the VC accepts, it has to decide the optimal trigger c∗V to start while the
equityholders decide the outsoucing share α∗V .
As it appears the decision setting changes with respect to the case of debt seen before, where
the equityholders retained both the decisions on the timing of the investment and the proportion of
outsourced input. Now, the sequence of moves can be summarized as follows: Equityholders oﬀer
ψ, the VC decides when to invest accepting that the equityholders set α. However, as the decison
on the OS share is still in the hands of the equityholders, the VC agrees to parteciapte only for the
direct cost to keep internal facilities working.
Since entry takes place as usual at ct > d, with the ﬁrm initially producing the input in-
house, proceeding backward the equityholders ﬁrst decide the OS share conditional on ct. Then the
VC knows the reaction function α∗V (ct) and decides the optimal trigger c∗V . Equityholders may
anticipate their oﬀer ψ that could be announced even before entry takes place, i.e., at t.
The problem for the equityholders is to select the optimal α that maximizes (4) minus the cost
of the technology after the ﬁnancial cost:
α∗V = argmax

(1− ψ)V U (ct;α)− (1− ζ)k1 −
k2
2
α2
	
(23)
25Notice that we can model the above setting as a sequential game where, at each time s ≥ t, the equityholders
oﬀer ψ and the VC can accept or reject the oﬀer. Thus, at every point of time, the VC has the action set [Accept,
Reject] that can be seen as a perpetual call option. See Lukas and Welling (2014) for an application of this game to
supply chains.
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where ζ ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the investiment ﬁnanced by VC. Solving (23) yields:
α∗V (ct) =

1 if ct ≤ c˜
V
(1−ψ)A
k2
c
β2
t if ct > c˜
V (24)
where c˜V ≡

k2
(1−ψ)A
1/β2
≤ c˜U .
Now, deﬁning FV (ct) as the value of the option to invest by the VC and T
∗V = inf{t ≥ 0 | ct =
c∗V } as the optimal investment timing, we can prove that:
Proposition 4 The ex-ante value of the ﬁrm is:
FV (ct) =

FV c
β2
t for ct > c
∗V
ψ

p−d
r + A˜(α
∗L(c∗L))c
β2
t

− ζk1 for ct ≤ c∗V
. (26.1)
where the constant FV = 2ψA˜(α∗L(c∗L)), while the optimal trigger is:
c∗V =


k2
ψ

ψ p−dr − ζk1

A

1/β2
(26.2)
and the OS share is:
α∗V = min

 1−ψψ ψ p−dr − ζk1
k2
, 1
 (26.3)
Proof : See Appendix D
As before substituting F V in (26.1) we see that the value of the option to invest is equal to the
option to go OS multiplied by 2ψ. So only if ψ = 12 the shareholders and the VC evenly split the
market value of the ﬁrm and the value of the option to invest is equal to the value of the option to
outsource. Unlike previous cases, the condition for the existence and the ﬁniteness of the optimal
trigger is ψ > ζk1p−d
r
, while the necessary condition for having c∗V > c˜V and then α∗V < 1, is now
ψ p−dr − ζk1 <
ψ
1−ψ
k2
2 .
Notice that , as it is to be expected, for values of ψ tending to the extremes of the feasible
interval ( ζk1p−d
r
, 1), it is optimal for equityholders to give up the ﬂexible technology, i.e. α∗V → 0.
If ψ → 1 equityholders are selling the ﬁrm to VC, in this case it makes no sense to invest in a
ﬂexible technology. On the contrary, if equityholders announce a small proﬁt share, i.e., ψ → ζk1p−d
r
,
the VC invests immediately to reap the proﬁts as soon as possible. However, investing in a ﬂexible
technology with a high ct is too risky and the equityholders choose zero ﬂexibility.26
The comparison with respect to the unlevered ﬁrm is summarized in the following proposition:
26This is consistend with the comparative statics of (26.2) and (26.3). That is, ∂c
∗V
∂ψ
< 0 and ∂α
∗V
∂ψ
> 0 for
ψ ∈ ( ζk1p−d
r
,

ζk1
p−d
r
). On the contrary ∂c
∗V
∂ψ
≥ 0 and ∂α
∗V
∂ψ
≤ 0 for ψ ∈ [

ζk1
p−d
r
, 1).
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Proposition 5 If the ﬂexible technology is partially ﬁnanced by a venture capitalist, then:
c∗V ≥ c∗U for ψ ∈ (
ζk1
p−d
r
, ψ1] (27.1)
c∗V < c∗U for ψ ∈ (ψ1, 1)
where ψ1 is the positive root of Ψ(ψ) = 2ψ
2

p−d
r − k1

− 2ψ

p−d
r − k1

+ ψ p−dr − ζk1.
While, if ζk1p−d
r
< ζ2−ζ < 1, the optimal OS level is:
α∗V < α∗U for all ψ ∈ (
ζk1
p−d
r
, 1) (27.2)
Proof : See Appendix E
When ψ is low, i.e., ψ ∈ ( ξk1p−d
r
, ψ1], the VC enters earlier than the unlevered ﬁrm. With ψ low,
the VC is better oﬀ anticipating the time he will receive the "sure" proﬁts from producing in-house.
On the contrary, if ψ is high, i.e., ψ ∈ (ψ1, 1), the option value to wait for "expected" higher proﬁts
from OS prevails and the VC enters later than the unlevered ﬁrm. In addition, the equityholders
choose a lower level of OS with respect to the unlevered ﬁrm if ζk1p−d
r
< ζ2−ζ which, consistently with
the previuos result, it is alwyas satisﬁed if ψ < ξ.
Using (10) and Proposition 4, we ﬁnd that:27
FV (ct)
FU (ct)
= 2[ψ(1− ψ)]1/2


ψ p−dr − ζk1


p−d
r − k1

1/2 for ct > max(c∗V , c∗U )
Unlike the preceding case, the value of the option to invest for the VC may be higher than the
option for the unlevered ﬁrm. This may occur in the odd case where ψ is much higher than ζ.
The intuition: the higher the share of proﬁts going to the VC vis à vis the capital commitment the
higher is the value of the option to invest in the ﬁrm for the VC.
Finally, an open question is the determination of the share parameter ψ. The equityholders
may set ψ, maximizing the portion of value they keep.28 In this case they may announce ψ before
the optimal investment timing c∗V by maximizing the following function:
max
ψ∗
Et(e
−r(TV−t))

(1− ψ)V U (c∗V ;α∗V (c∗V ))− (1− ζ)k1 −
k2
2
(α∗V (c∗V ))2
	
.
27 If in both cases α∗V = α∗U = 1 the ratio reduces to 2ψ
28 In a diﬀerent environment Banerjee et al. (2014) introduce a bargaining as to the share parameter and ﬁnd that
it is ineﬃcient to set it before the investment because of the emerging time inconsistency. Only a bargaining carried
out after the investment may assure temporal eﬃciency.
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Recalling that Et(e
−r(TV −t)) =

ct
c∗V
β2 and using Proposition 4, we able to reduce the above
expression to:
max
ψ∗
 ct
c∗V
β2 
3(1− ψ)
p− d
r
− 2
1− ψ
ψ
ζk1 − (1− ζ)k1
	
(28)
where c∗V is given by (26.2). Notice that feasibility requires that, for any ψ > 0, the value of the
ﬁrm for the equityholders at the time of the investment be positive. On the basis of the above
results it is easy to show that it is never optimal to choose a value ψ → 1 since it would imply a
negative value for (28). Therefore, consistently with the ﬁrm value maximization by equityholders
ψ∗must lie in the range ( ζk1p−d
r
, 1[ .
Since c∗V is not monotone in ψ, the optimal share cannot be investigated analitically. Then, we
resort to numerical simulations. The parameter scenario we choose is given by p−dr = 100, 70, 50,
with ζ = 1, 0.9, 0.6. The cost k1 to keep internal facilities working is normalized to one while the
convex component of the organizational cost k22 is set to 50.
29 The optimal share ψ∗ is described
in Table 1 and for α∗V in Table 2.30
ψ∗; (ψ1)
p−d
r
100 70 50
1 5.3%; (50.5%) 6.0%; (50.7%) 6.7%; (50.9%)
ζ 0.9 5.0% ; (50.4%) 5.8%; (50.6%) 6.5%; (50.8%)
0.6 4.2%; (50.0%) 4.9%; (50.1%) 5.6%; (50.2%)
Table 1: The Optimal share of proﬁts ψ∗ oﬀered to the VC
α∗V p−dr
100 70 50
1 0.62 0.50 0.40
ζ 0.9 0.62 0.51 0.41
0.6 0.64 0.52 0.43
Table 2: Optimal OS share α∗V
The simulations reported in Table 1 and 2 conﬁrm our results. The higher is p−dr , i.e., the
proﬁtability of vertical integration, the lower is the risk associated with the adoption of the ﬂexible
technology and the ﬁrm can aﬀord much OS. This is shown in Table 2. Moreover, if p−dr is high
the shareholders will give a low share to the VC. On the contrary, if p−dr goes down, ψ
∗ must
increase to induce the VC to invest. Obviously ψ∗ goes down if the investment share of the VC ζ
goes down, as Table 1 shows.
29This component has been calibrated so as to get, with α = 0.2, a ratio 2 to 1 with the ﬁxed cost.
30See Appendix F for the Simulation background.
17
Moreover, we observe that the level of ﬂexibility α∗V increases as the share ζ decreases. The
intuition can be seen reading together Table 1 and 2. In Tab 1 we see that ψ∗ goes down if the
involvment of the VC goes down. Then, the equityholders will increase the level of ﬂexibility to
balance the ﬁxed cost and the organizational cost and delay the investment. Obviuosly, if ζ → 0
then α∗V → α∗U and c∗V → c∗U .
As for the VC a further explanation may come from the comparison with Yoshida (2012) where,
in a diﬀerent context, the extent of ﬂexibility chosen by one agent aﬀects the level of uncertainty
of the scenario. In a symmetric framework the more ﬂexibility is adopted by an agent the more is
chosen by the rival (ﬂexibility is a strategic complement). The increase in (endogeneous) uncertainty
associated with the extent of ﬂexibility makes for an investment delay. In our framework this kind
of simmetry is absent since the extent of ﬂexibility is chosen (asymmetrically) only by one party,
the incumbent equityholders. Their choice puts a ceiling on uncertainty making the investment
occur earlier.
6 Epilogue
We have considered a ﬁrm that has to decide simultaneously the internal vertical setting and the
ﬁnancial structure in a dynamic stochastic framework. The ﬁrm we analyse is vertically ﬂexible
since it has an option to outsource entirely or partially a necessary input and it can reverse its choice
by going back to in-house production, i.e., vertical integration. Unlike recent literature (Benaroch
et al. 2012) we have not examined the choice of complete OS vis à vis vertically integrating, yet
we have gone through a set of ﬁnancial issues of a vertically ﬂexible corporate organization where
partial and reversible OS occur.
Flexibility comes with a cost required to set up a suitable supply chain and to keep alive the
know how and the facilities to backsource the input in case market circumstances require to do
so. We have investigated two possible ﬁnancial avenues for the vertically ﬂexible ﬁrm. First we
have studied the case of debt ﬁnancing. A lender may be willing to ﬁnance the ﬁrm that invests in
ﬂexibility if she gets a suitable "sweetener" such as an option to buy out the ﬁrm in case ﬂexibility
becomes useless. The option is required to make the lender willing to ﬁnance the corporate ﬁrm
where limited liability may induce the incumbent equityholders to overinvest. With debt the
shareholders rush to invest earlier with respect to a corresponding pure equity unlevered ﬁrm. The
levered ﬁrm decides the level of OS and the timing of the invrestment while the lender sets only
the size of the investment and the buy out time. Vertical ﬂexibility is a cushion against risk but it
is costly. If ﬁnancial providers require collaterals which are too expensive it may not be worth. In
such a case the value of a levered ﬂexible ﬁrm may be lower than the value of an unleverd vertically
unﬂexible ﬁrm and the strategic value of the option to become ﬂexible may turn negative. We
went through a second possible ﬁnancial arrangement for the vertically ﬂexible ﬁrm considering a
venture capitalist ﬁnancing the production of the necessary input. In this case it appears that the
level of ousoucing is lower than in the case of the unlevered ﬁrm and the investment takes place
earlier. As the share of the ﬁrm oﬀered to the venture capitalist decreases (ψ → 0) the behaviour
of the ﬁrm converges to the unlevered case. The main results are sumed up in Table 3 below:
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Levered vs Unlevered Joint Venture vs Unlevered
c∗L < c∗U c∗V < c∗U
α∗L = α∗U α∗V < α∗U
Table 3: sum up of results for time of entry (c∗) and ﬂexibility adopted (α∗)
In the end we may say that ﬁnancing ﬂexibility with a warranted debt - the only one that
is consistent with an eﬃcient allocation of debt in the presence of limited liability - induces the
ﬁrm to invest earlier but not more than the unlevered ﬁrm. Then, debt makes a ﬁrm more eager
to go ﬂexible to anticipate reaping expected proﬁts. This is consistent with common observation
suggesting that debt may accelerate innovation in organizational ﬂexibility.
The venture capitalist case provides a bunch of suggestive results. If to the venture capitalist is
given a small share of the project she will invest earlier than the unlevered ﬁrm since she aims at
cashing proﬁts as soon as possible (syndrome of the poor VC) and the amount of OS adopted is lower
than in the case of debt. With the VC the ﬁrm acquires less OS. It seems that the sharing of risk
that the involvment of the VC implies makes the ﬁrm less eager to have a high OS as an insurance
against uncertainty. As for the optimal share of proﬁts (or simply of the ﬁrm) to be given to the
VC there exists an internal solution that makes the VC solution reasonable and implementable. A
conclusion out of the epilogue should be that there is no unique way to increase ﬂexibility in the
vertical organization of a ﬁrm because the way it is ﬁnanced always makes a diﬀerence. Yet debt
appears not only as the easiest and handiest device but seems to be able to accelerate investment
and to carry it out at a level that is not lower than that ﬁnanced with internal cash ﬂow.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The standard arbitrage and hedging arguments require that the vertically ﬂexible ﬁrm value,
V U (ct;α), is the solution of the following dynamic programming problems (i.e., the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations):
ΓV U (ct;α) = −(p− d), for ct > d (A.1)
and
ΓV U (ct;α) = −(p− αct − (1− α)d), for ct < d, (A.2)
where Γ is the diﬀerential operator: Γ = −r + γc ∂∂c +
1
2σ
2c2 ∂
2
∂c2
. The solution of (A.1) and (A.2)
requires the following boundary conditions:
lim
c→∞

V U (ct;α)−
p− d
r

= 0 if ct > d
and
lim
c→0

V U(ct;α)−

p− (1− α)d
r
−
αct
r − γ

= 0, if ct < d
where p−dr is the present value of the ﬁrm “making” the input, while

p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ

is the
present value when “buying” a share α of the input. Then, from the assumptions and the linearity
of (A.1) and (A.2), using the above boundary conditions, we get:
V U (ct;α) =

p−d
r + A˜c
β2
t if ct > d
p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ

+ B˜c
β1
t if ct < d.
(A.3)
where β2 < 0 and β1 > 1 are, respectively, the negative and the positive roots of the characteristic
equation: Φ(β) ≡ 12σ
2β(β − 1) + γβ − r. Finally, by the value matching and the smooth pasting
conditions at ct = d we obtain the two constants (Dixit and Pyndyck, 1994, p. 189):
B˜ = αB ≡ αβ1−β2
(r − γβ2)d
1−β1 1
r(r−γ)
A˜ = αA ≡ αβ1−β2
(r − γβ1)d
1−β2 1
r(r−γ) .
(A.4)
which are always nonnegative and linear in α.
Since A˜ = αA, the optimal vertical arrangement is given by:
α∗U = argmax


NPV V I(ct, α)

(A.5)
= argmax

p− d
r
+ αAc
β2
t − k1 −
k2
2
α2
	
.
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Then, the FOC is:
Ac
β2
t − k2α = 0 (A.6)
while the SOC is always satisﬁed. From (A.6) we obtain (7) in the text:
α∗U (ct) =

1 if ct ≤ c˜
U
A
k2
c
β2
t if ct > c˜
U
where c˜U ≡

k2
A
1/β2
.
Let’s now consider the ﬁrm’s ex-ante value FU (ct). In the range of ct where the option to wait
to invest is positive FU (ct) is still given by the solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation:
ΓFU (ct) = 0, for ct > c
∗U (A.7)
where c∗U is the threshold at which it is eﬃcient to invest. Since when ct approaches inﬁnity F
U (ct)
should go to zero, the solution of (A.7) requires the boundary condition, limc→∞ F
U (ct) = 0. By
the linearity of (A.7) and using the boundary condition, we obtain:
FU (ct) = F
Uc
β2
t , (A.8)
where β2 is the negative root of Φ(β). To evaluate the constant F
U and the optimal entry trigger
c∗U , the FU (ct) must satisfy the matching value and smooth pasting conditions:
FU (c∗U ) = NPV U (c∗U , α∗U (c∗U )), (A.9.1)
FUc (c
∗U ) = NPV Uc (c
∗U , α∗U (c∗U )), (A.9.2)
where the second equality follows from NPV Uα (c
∗U , α∗U (c∗U )) = 0 by (A.5). Conditions (A.9.1)
and (A.9.2) say that the optimal share of OS α is set when the investment takes place. Substituting
(A.8) into (A.9.1) and (A.9.2) we obtain:
FUc∗Uβ2 =
p− d
r
+ A˜(α∗U (c∗U ))c∗Uβ2 − k1 −
k2
2
(α∗U (c∗U ))2
β2F
Uc∗Uβ2−1 = β2A˜(α
∗U (c∗U ))c∗Uβ2−1
from which we get:
FU = A˜(α∗U (c∗U )) (A.10.1)
and
k2
2
(α∗U (c∗U ))2 =
p− d
r
− k1 (A.10.2)
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Simply substituting (A.6) in (A.10.2) we obtain:
c∗U =


2k2

p−d
r − k1

A

1/β2
and α∗U = min

p−dr − k1
k2/2
, 1
 (A.11)
from which it is easy to show that c∗U > c˜U if p−dr − k1 <
k2
2 .
B Appendix: Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations describing the market value of equity is the same as in
(A.1) and (A.2), except that the cash ﬂow accruing to equityholders is now p − d −D for ct > d
and p−D−αct− (1−α)d for the case c
l ≤ ct < d, where c
l is the input price triggering the lender
to buy out the ﬁrm. The general solution can be expressed as:
p
(p− d−D)
r
+ Aˆc
β2
t if ct > d, (B.1)
and 
p− (1− α)d−D
r
−
αct
(r − γ)

+ Bˆ1c
β1
t + Bˆ2c
β2
t if c
l < ct < d. (B.2)
By the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions at ct = d and the boundary condition
E

cl;α

= 0, we get the system:
(p− d−D)
r
+ Aˆdβ2 =

p− (1− α)d−D
r
−
αd
r − γ

+ Bˆ1d
β1 + Bˆ2d
β2 (B.3.1)
and
β2Aˆd
β2−1 = −
α
r − γ
+ β1Bˆ1d
β1−1 + β2Bˆ2d
β2−1 (B.3.2)
and 
p− (1− α)d−D
r
−
αcl
r − γ

+ Bˆ1c
lβ1 + Bˆ2c
lβ2 = 0. (B.3.3)
Solving the system made by (B.3.1) and (B.3.2), we obtain:
Bˆ1 = B˜ =
1
(β1 − β2)
r − γβ2
r
αd1−β2
(r − γ)
(B.4)
and
Aˆ = A˜+ Bˆ2 =
αd1−β2
(r − γ)

r − γβ1
r(β1 − β2)
	
+ Bˆ2. (B.5)
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Let us now consider the debt. Similarly to equity, it must satisfy the following diﬀerential equations:
ΓD(ct;α) = −D, for ct > c
l, (B.6.1)
and
ΓD(ct;α) = −(p− αct − (1− α)d), for ct ≤ c
l, (B.6.2)
with the two boundary conditions:
lim
c→∞

D(ct;α)−
D
r

= 0
and
lim
c→cl

D(ct;α)−

p− (1− α)d
r
−
αct
r − γ

= 0.
The solution is:
D (ct;α) =

D
r +Cc
β2
t if ct > c
l,
p−(1−α)d
r −
αct
r−γ if ct ≤ c
l.
(B.7)
By imposing the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions at ct = c
l we obtain:
cl =
β2
β2 − 1
r − γ
α

p− (1− α)d−D
r
	
(B.8)
and
C = −
1
β2 − 1

p− (1− α)d−D
r
	
(cl)−β2 > 0. (B.9)
Substituting (B.4) and (B.9) in (B.3.3) we get Cclβ2 + B˜clβ1 + Bˆ2c
lβ2 = 0. Since the ﬁrst and the
second terms are positive, the equality is satisﬁed only if:
Bˆ2 < 0. (B.10)
Finally, from (B.5) and (B.10) we are able to isolate Aˆ and Bˆ2 respectively, i.e.:
Aˆ = αA− αBcl(β1−β2) −C. (B.11)
and
Bˆ2 = −C − αBc
l(β1−β2). (B.12)
If cl → 0 then Aˆ→ αA > 0 and Bˆ2 → 0 > 0, we are back to the unlevered ﬁrm. If cl → d we have:
Aˆ→−αd
γ
(r − γ)
1
r
d−β2 +
p− (1− α)d−D
r
d−β2
β2 − 1
< 0
which is always negative.
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C Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
By (B.4), (B.5) and (B.9), we note that Aˆ+ C = A˜+ Bˆ2 +C = α[A−Bc
l(β1−β2)]. Then, by (14)
the optimal vertical arrangement is given by:
α∗L = argmax

p− d
r
+ α[A−Bcl(β1−β2)]− k1 −
k2
2
α2
	
(C.1)
and the FOC is:
Ac
β2
t − k2α−Bc
lβ1−β2

1− (β1 − β2)
p− d−D
p− (1− α)d−D

c
β2
t = 0. (C.2)
Deﬁning S(α) = Bclβ1−β2

1− (β1 − β2)
p−d−D
p−(1−α)d−D

< 0, we are able to reduce (C.2) to:
[A− S(α∗L)]c
β2
t − k2α
∗L = 0. (C.3)
We go through the SOC:
∂FOC
∂α
= −k2 −
r − γβ2
r
1
(β1 − β2)
1
(r − γ)
d1−β1(β1 − β2)c
∗β1−β2c
β2
t
c∗−1

1−

p− d−D
p− (1− α)d−D

−

d(d+D − p)
(p− (1− α)d−D)2
	
The sign depends on:
(1−

p− d−D
p− (1− α)d−D

)−

d(d+D − p)
(p− (1− α)d−D)2
	
which is always positive, making for a veriﬁed SOC.
We deﬁne FL(ct) as the value of the option to invest by the levered ﬁrm. The constant F
L and
the optimal trigger c∗L must satisfy the matching value and smooth pasting conditions:
FLc∗Lβ2 =
p− d
r
+ A˜(α∗L(c∗L))c∗Lβ2 −

c∗L
cl
β2
B˜(α∗L(c∗L))clβ1 − k1 −
k2
2
(α∗L(c∗L))2 (C.4)
FLβ2c
∗Lβ2−1 = A˜(α∗L(c∗L))β2c
∗Lβ2−1 − β2

c∗L
cl
β2−1 1
cl
B˜(α∗L(c∗L))clβ1 (C.5)
from which:
FL = A˜(α∗L(c∗L))− B˜(α∗L(c∗L)cl(β1−β2) (C.6)
k2
2
(α∗L(c∗L))2 =
p− d
r
− k1. (C.7)
Simply, substituting (C.3) in (C.7) we obtain:
c∗L =


2k2

p−d
r − k1

A− S(α∗L)

1/β2
and α∗L = min

p−dr − k1
k2/2
, 1
 (C.8)
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D Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
Let’s deﬁne FV (ct) as the value of the option to invest by the venture capitalist. The optimal entry
trigger c∗V must satisfy the matching value and smooth pasting conditions:
FV (c∗V ) = ψV U (c∗V ;α∗V (c∗V ))− ζk1, (D.1)
FVc (c
∗V ) = ψ

V Uc (c
∗V ;α∗V (c∗V )) + V Uα (c
∗V ;α∗V (c∗V ))
dα∗V
dct |ct=c∗V
	
(D.2)
where α∗V (ct) is given by (24). Substituting for V
U we get:
FV c∗V β2 = ψ
p− d
r
+ ψα∗V (c∗V )Ac∗V β2 − ζk1
FV β2c
∗V β2−1 = ψα∗V (c∗V )β2Ac
∗V β2−1 + ψAc∗V β2
dα∗V
dct |ct=c∗V
= 2ψα∗V (c∗V )β2Ac
∗V β2−1
where the last equality follows from the fact that:
dα∗V
dct |ct=c∗V
=
(1− ψ)β2Ac
β2−1
t
k2 |ct=c∗V
= β2ct
−1α|ct=c∗V < 0.
By substituting it back in the matching value and smooth pasting conditions, we obtain:
FV = 2ψα∗V (c∗V )A (D.3)
and
ψ
1− ψ
k2[α
∗V (c∗V )]2 = ψ
p− d
r
− ζk1 (D.4)
Simply, substituting (24) in (D.4) we obtain:
c∗V =


1−ψ
ψ k2

ψ p−dr − ζk1

(1− ψ)A

1/β2
and α∗V = min

 1−ψψ ψ p−dr − ζk1
k2
, 1
 (D.5)
from which is easy to show that c∗V > 0 if ψ p−dr − ζk1 > 0 and c
∗V > c˜V if ψ p−dr − ζk1 <
ψ
1−ψk2.
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E Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
Consider condition c∗V < c∗U , i.e.:

1−ψ
ψ k2

ψ p−dr − ζk1

(1− ψ)A

1/β2
<


2k2

p−d
r − k1

A

1/β2
(E.1)
Since β2 < 0 this reduces to:
Ψ(ψ) = 2ψ2

p− d
r
− k1

− 2ψ

p− d
r
− k1

+ ψ
p− d
r
− ζk1 (E.2)
= ψ(ψ − 1)2

p− d
r
− k1

+ ψ
p− d
r
− ζk1 > 0
where Ψ(ψ) it is a parabola convex with Ψ(1) = p−dr − ζk1 > 0, and Ψ(0) = −ζk1 < 0. Therefore,
the two roots are : 0 < ψ1 < 1, and ψ2 < 0. In addition, since ψ must be greater than
ζk1
p−d
r
and
Ψ( ζk1p−d
r
) ≤ 0, we may reduce the range to:
c∗V < c∗U for ψ ∈ (ψ1, 1) (E.3)
c∗V ≥ c∗U for ψ ∈ (
ζk1
p−d
r
, ψ1].
Let us see now the the condition α∗V < α∗U , i.e.:
1−ψ
ψ

ψ p−dr − ζk1

k2
<

2

p−d
r − k1

k2
from which it appears that:
Σ(ψ) = −ψ2
p− d
r
− ψ

p− d
r
− (2 + ζ)k1

− ζk1 < 0 (E.4)
where Σ(ψ) is a parabola concave, with Σ(1) < 0 and Σ( ζk1p−d
r
) < 0. Further, since Σ′(ψ) = −2ψ p−dr −
p−d
r − (2 + ζ)k1

it is easy to show that Σ′(1) < 1 and Σ′( ζk1p−d
r
) < 0 if −p−dr + k1 + (1 − ζ)k1 <
0.Therefore, if ζ is large (the VC pays for a high chunk of the investment), Σ′( ζk1p−d
r
) < 0 and we
may conclude that:
α∗V < α∗U for all ψ ∈ (
ζk1
p−d
r
, 1). (E.5)
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F Appendix: Simulation background
The shareholders’ problem is to set ψ to maximize the following function:
max
ψ
 ct
c∗V
β2
[G(ψ)] (F.1)
where c∗V is given by (D.5) and:
G(ψ) = 3(1− ψ)s− 2
1− ψ
ψ
k − (k1 − k)
with s = p−dr and k = ζk1. Since g(
k
s ) = s−k1 > 0 and g(1) = −(k−k1) < 0, it is never optimal to
set ψ = 1 since that implies (F.1) negative. On the contrary, if we go towards ψ = ks equityholders
have always a positive value of (F.1). Therefore, the acceptable range is ψ ∈ (ks , 1[
To get the optimal ψ we go through the FOC:
f(ψ) ≡

2
ψ2
k − 3s
	
−

3(1− ψ)s− 2
1− ψ
ψ
k − (k1 − k)
	
β2
1
c∗V
dc∗V
dψ
= 0 (F.2)
By totally diﬀerentiating (D.4) we get:
−ψ((1− ψ))β2
1
c∗V
dc∗V
dψ
=
1
2
1
ψs− k


ψ2s− k

which, once substituted in (F.2), reduces the FOC to:
f(ψ) ≡

−3s+
2
ψ2
k
	
−

3(1− ψ)s− 2
1− ψ
ψ
k − (k1 − k)
	
1
2
1
ψs− k
(ψ2s− k)(−
1
ψ(1− ψ)
)
	
= 0(F.3)
= (1− ψ)


−3s2ψ3 + 4sψ2k + ψsk − 2k2

+ (k − k1)ψ(k − ψ
2s) = 0
and the SOC is:
f ′(ψ) ≡


3s2ψ3 − 4sψ2k − ψsk + 2k2

+ (1−ψ)


−9s2ψ2 + 8sψk + sk

+ (k− k1)[k− 3ψ
2s] (F.4)
Calculating f(ψ) in the extremes we obtain:
f(1) = (k − k1)(k − s) > 0
f(
k
s
) = −
k2(k − s)(2k − k1 − s)
s2
< 0
To have a maximum we look, in the interval (ks , 1[ , for a root ψ
∗ of (F.3) with a negative value of
(F.4), i.e. f ′(ψ∗) < 0.
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